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GRAY CLOUD OBSCURES THE RAINBOW:
WHY HOMOSEXUALITY AS DEFAMATION
CONTRADICTS NEW JERSEY PUBLIC
POLICY TO COMBAT HOMOPHOBIA
AND PROMOTE EQUAL PROTECTION
Rachel M. Wrightson*
Homophobia is far too complex a phenomenon to have a
singular explanation. Gay people are stigmatized by
several sources, including religion, social mores, and . . .
the law. Eliminating one cause of stigmatization among
many may not be a panacea but would be a step in the
right direction.
— Christopher R. Leslie1
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary defamation law has been characterized as
plagued with infirmities and ripe for reform.2 Modern attempts at
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Northwestern University,
1998. The author would like to thank Professor Nan Hunter and the staff of
the Journal of Law and Policy. She also acknowledges Eric D. Sherman for
his generous contribution of sources cited herein.
1
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
‘Unenforced’ Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 105 (2000).
2
See Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law
Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 291 (1994). According to Ackerman, “one of the most uncertain areas of
modern American jurisprudence, the law of defamation remains largely a
mystery to commentators and practitioners alike.” Id. at 291. He further
stated, “the law of defamation is in disarray. It is confusing. It is unclear.” Id.

635

WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC

636

7/24/02 11:36 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

clarification have unabashedly begun with the assumption that the
current framework for the law of defamation and libel “isn’t
working well for anyone.”3 In the context of such confusion, it is
not surprising that the question of whether calling someone gay is
defamatory has not been uniformly analyzed or answered by the
courts.4 In Gray v. Press Communications, LLC,5 the Appellate
Division of New Jersey determined that an imputation of
homosexuality is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory
meaning.6 This comment combines an analysis of relevant
legislation and caselaw to conclude that Gray was wrongly
decided. New Jersey’s current legislation and prior court rulings
do not support the conclusion that reference to an individual as a
homosexual lowers the community’s estimation of the
individual’s reputation.7 Additionally, Gray is inconsistent with
at 293. Ackerman’s article reviews the “infirmities that plague contemporary
defamation law in the United States” and sets forth an analysis of Uniform
Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act as proposed and withdrawn in
1993. Id. at 294.
3
Robert J. Hawley, Libel Litigation: An Overview of the Uniform
Defamation Act, PRAC. LAW INST. G4-3883, at 645 (1992). Hawley’s article
reviews a report promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws regarding the proposed Uniform Defamation Act of
1989. Id. The report set forth a comprehensive model Libel Reform Act,
designed to “encourage the dissemination of truth in the public realm and
facilitate efficient resolution of defamation disputes.” Id.
4
See Randy M. Fogle, Is Calling Someone “Gay” Defamatory?: The
Meaning of Reputation, Community Mores, Gay Rights, and Free Speech, 3
LAW & SEX 165, 165 (1993) (noting that “[c]ourts have analyzed the issue
differently and have reached different results”).
5
775 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001), cert. denied, 788
A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001). The appellate division reversed the trial court’s
dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation suit and found that a radio call-in show
host’s characterization of a former host of children’s shows as “the lesbian
cowgirl” was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Id. at 684.
6
Id.
7
New Jersey’s legislature has enacted a number of laws that provide legal
protection for the rights of gays and lesbians in the state, and New Jersey
courts have broadly construed many of the state laws to provide redress to the
lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender individuals. See infra Part II
(discussing and analyzing a sampling of these enactments and cases).
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the New Jersey court system’s progressive approach to protecting
the rights of gays and lesbians, and ultimately has deleterious
effects upon the state’s concerted effort to promote equal
protection of gays and lesbians.
This comment focuses on the extent to which defamation law
purportedly reflects community standards and on the judge’s role
in a defamation suit to either condone or condemn societal
disapprobation of allegedly defamatory characteristics.8 Part I
reviews the elements of defamation law, the pleading
requirements in New Jersey for a defamation claim, and
examines New Jersey legislation and caselaw relevant to issues of
sexual orientation. Part II places Gray in the context of statutory
language and caselaw and concludes that Gray was wrongly
decided because it is inconsistent with the state’s position on
sexual orientation and the law. This section also argues that Gray
has a deleterious effect upon equal protection of gays and
lesbians in society and perpetuates homophobia. Part III proposes
a model for how the court should have examined the issue in
Gray to avoid the harmful effects of allowing an imputation of
homosexuality to be actionable in a court of law.
I. DEFAMATION LAW AND IMPUTATIONS OF HOMOSEXUALITY AS
DEFAMATORY
Defamation has long been viewed as an amorphous, if not
elusive, tort.9 Throughout history, the legal boundaries of
defamation law have changed, and conclusions about whether

8

See Lyrissa Barnett Lidksy, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of
Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1996). Lidsky first notes that “the
prevailing American rule asks whether the statement was defamatory in the
eyes of a substantial and respectable minority [in the community].” Id. at 17.
She also states that “[i]dentifying what is respectable encourages judges to
make normative judgments about the desirability of the beliefs of subgroups
within the general community.” Id. at 20. See also infra Part I.D (explaining
judicial discretion in defamation actions).
9
PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (5th ed. 1984). Dean
Prosser began his discussion of the law of defamation by proposing that “there
is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense.” Id. at 771-72.
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allegedly defamatory statements are actionable have varied in
time and place.10 In certain instances, statements that may have
been actionable as defamatory per se in one generation or context
are no longer regarded as defamatory at all.11 For example,
statements suggesting that an individual is a fascist,12
Communist,13 or a racist14 were once actionable but are now
properly dismissed as non-defamatory. The notion that
religious,15 racial, or ethnic labels are susceptible of a defamatory
10

Thomas F. Daly, Defamation, 19 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 2 (1972); see
also Fogle, supra note 4, at 172 (noting, “the notion that what is considered
defamatory is continuously evolving has been widely recognized”).
11
MICHAEL MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEW LOOK AT
DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY xvi (1987) (noting that “the categories [of
defamation] change as yesterday’s derogatory phrase becomes today’s
innocuous aside or even compliment”).
12
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding a written
statement asserting that a periodical and a newspaper column frequently print
news items and interpretations picked up from openly fascist journals was not
libelous, since issue of what constitutes an “openly fascist” journal is matter of
opinion).
13
Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945) (calling a
lawyer a communist sympathizer was defamatory); Toomey v. Farley, 156
N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (1956) (finding that to charge one with being a communist
or with having communist affiliations and sympathies is defamatory, justifying
an action for libel); but see PETER F. CARTER-RUCK & RICHARD WALKER,
CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 37 (3d ed. 1985) (hereinafter CARTERRUCK) (noting that “it is probable now that such a statement [of communism]
would be held to be defamatory. . . . [I]t is essential to consider the attitude of
the country, as a whole and at the time, to the particular political party of
which it is alleged the plaintiff is a member.”); see also MARK A. FRANKLIN
ET. AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 302 (6th ed. 2000) (stating that “‘Communist’
seems to have gone from being nondefamatory before World War II to being
defamatory during the McCarthy era and the Cold War, and perhaps now to
being nondefamatory again”).
14
See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“Accusations of racism no longer are ‘obviously and naturally harmful.’ The
word has been watered down by overuse, becoming common coin in political
discourse.”). For a general examination of categories, see MAYER, supra note
11, at 33-38.
15
See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that calling someone
Roman Catholic during the reign of Charles II was actionable for defamation,
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meaning has also been largely rejected.16 For example, in the
early 1900s false statements that a white person was AfricanAmerican were regularly deemed defamatory.17 Although there is
no caselaw expressly overruling these cases, such suits have
largely ceased.18 Modern opinions assume that such an allegation
is not defamatory at all.19
One commentator interpreted dismissal of these actions as
judicial attempts to avoid sanctioning discriminatory attitudes.20
Another unequivocally stated that the range of statements courts
have labeled as defamatory proves that defamation law is founded
on social prejudice.21 At a minimum, the fact that judges dispose
of some defamation claims, rather than submitting questions to a
jury, “reflect a belief that what is actionable as defamation is

but was not actionable under the reign of James I, and it would not be
actionable today).
16
See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. Ct. App.
1977) (“The term ‘nigger’ is one of insult, abuse and belittlement harking
back to slavery days. Its use is resented, and rightly so. It nevertheless is not
within any category recognized as slanderous per se.”); Arturi v. Tiebie, 179
A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (Sullivan, J.A.D.,
concurring) (determining that reference to plaintiff as a “dirty guinea,” a slang
expression for an Italian immigrant, though crude and objectionable, was not
defamatory).
17
See, e.g., Stulz v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917);
Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913); Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So.
577 (Ala. 1915); May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671 (La. 1910);
Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918); Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745
(Va. 1914).
18
For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Lidksy, supra note 8, at
29-33.
19
See Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (refusing to concede that plaintiff may have suffered from social
prejudice of others where plaintiff sued over the publication of a false obituary
that gave a funeral home listing that catered to a primarily “black clientel
[sic]”); see also Bradshaw, 563 P.2d at 514 (finding that the term “nigger”
was not defamatory per se and dismissing claims where plaintiff had not pled
special damages in accordance with state law); Lidsky, supra note 8, at 9.
20
Fogle, supra note 4, at 174 (“For example, the law of defamation may
ignore racism in our society because to do otherwise would sanction it.”).
21
Lidsky, supra note 8, at 28.
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freighted with policy considerations.”22 This evolution in the
categories of defamation illustrates that contemporary courts may
properly dismiss even those claims that may have been actionable
in prior eras.23 To a certain extent, a modern court sitting in
judgment of a defamation suit is entitled to pick and choose
which cases to entertain and which to dismiss.24 Courts are not
required to accept social prejudices as they find them.25
A. Common Law and Constitutional Components of
Defamation
Defamation is founded in the twin torts of libel and slander,
both designed to effectuate society’s “pervasive and strong
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”26
At common law, “[t]he gravamen or gist of an action for
defamation is damage to the plaintiff’s reputation.”27 The law “is
not concerned with the plaintiff’s own humiliation, wrath or
sorrow,”28 and “the damages sustained by a defamed plaintiff are
not to his personal feelings, but rather to those losses which
accompany an interference with one’s social, business, religious
or familial relations.”29 A cause of action cannot be sustained
simply because one feels insulted or angered by an epithet or

22

FRANKLIN, supra note 13, at 305.
See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution
of the categories of defamatory terms).
24
Lidsky, supra note 8, at 34.
25
Id.
26
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87-88 (1966) (holding that in order to
recover for damages allegedly sustained as a result of a news column allegedly
imputing mismanagement on the part of a public official, the plaintiff was
required to show that the asserted implication was specifically “of and
concerning” him, and jury instructions permitting him to recover upon a
finding merely that he was one of a small group, only some of whom were
implicated, were erroneous).
27
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 2 (1995).
28
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771.
29
Id. at 843.
23

WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC

HOMOSEXUALITY AS DEFAMATION

7/24/02 11:36 AM

641

statement.30
As a rule, the common law has not attempted to define
reputation,31 but substantial effort has been expended to articulate
the outlines of this elusive concept.32 The harm inflicted upon
one’s reputation has been characterized as “an impairment of a
‘relational’ interest, i.e., denigrat[ing] the opinion which others
in the community have of the plaintiff and invad[ing] the
plaintiff’s interest in his . . . good name.”33 Put another way,
“[d]efamation is that which tends to injure the reputation in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in which the person is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions about him.”34 It is
commonly understood that a defamation action affords a remedy
for damage to one’s general, public image.35
Further, the generally accepted definition is that “a
communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of
another so as to lower him or her in the opinion of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
30

Id.
See generally Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 875, 877 (1956).
32
See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986). The
author sketches three distinct concepts of reputation that the common law of
defamation has at various times in its history attempted to protect—reputation
as property, as honor, and as dignity—and explores how each weighs in the
balance against the constitutional interest in freedom of expression. Id.
33
Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. United Serv. Auto Assoc., 528 A.2d
64, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), construing HARPER & JAMES &
GRAY, LAW OF TORTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1986). The court further noted that “the
mere fact that the plaintiff’s feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not
enough to create a cause of action for defamation.” Id.
34
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 773.
35
See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., Inc., 516 A.2d 220, 224
(N.J. 1996) (comparing defamation to an action for product disparagement and
noting that “defamation . . . affords a remedy for damage to one’s reputation”
while the latter was characterized as “an offshoot of the cause of action for
interference with contractual relations, such as sales to a prospective buyer”)
(internal citations omitted). This assertion was confirmed by New Jersey’s
highest court. Id.
31
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with him or her.”36 To be defamatory, therefore, a statement
must not only be reasonably calculated to injure the victim’s
reputation37 but must tend to lower the plaintiff in the opinion of
respectable members of the community.38 Therefore, to establish
whether a statement is defamatory, the decision-maker must first
examine the community in whose opinion the plaintiff claims to
have been diminished.39 The determination of what constitutes the
community in which a statement is made is an essential factor in
assessing defamation liability.40 Although the process of defining
the boundaries of a “community” and the distillation of the
values held by “respectable members” therein is difficult, it
involves crucial public policy decisions that, when not directly
addressed by the courts, brings a lack of clarity into defamation
law.41
In the United States, defamation law is governed by a
balancing test whereby common law theories of a right to protect
one’s reputation are measured against constitutional protection of
the First Amendment exercise of free speech.42 Because of the
strong interest in uninhibited debate on public issues, courts now
recognize that the First Amendment protects statements made
concerning public officials or public figures, unless those
36

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
See Daly, supra note 10, at § 2.
38
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 1.
39
Lidsky, supra note 8, at 7.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 7-9 (suggesting that because defamation plays an important role
in setting the boundaries of community and choosing between competing
values, “the determination of community values and community identity
allows courts to advance policy goals by constructing by fiat a ‘respectable’
community that shares little in common with the actual community”). Lidsky
further argues that instead of constructing an artificial community through the
defamatoriness determination, courts should make explicit what are essentially
public policy choices. Id.
42
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme
Court first articulated this rule in 1964. Id. New Jersey courts have reaffirmed
this holding. See, e.g., Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1135-37
(N.J. 1999); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 152-55
(N.J. 1995).
37
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statements are made with knowledge that they were false or with
reckless disregard of whether they were false.43 With respect to
public figures, the burden of proof in defamation actions is
higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in
other civil actions.44 To satisfy this higher standard, “a plaintiff
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher
either knew that the statement was false or published with
reckless disregard for the truth.”45 This judicially imposed
standard requires that courts confronted with defamation suits
brought by public figures apply stricter scrutiny than required in
other civil actions.46 This higher legal bar functions as an
additional hurdle for plaintiffs in defamation actions and is an
important means of protecting and encouraging free speech.47
B. Pleading Defamation in New Jersey: Standards and
Requirements
Although the basic elements of defamation remain consistent
from state to state, there are many variations of what constitutes
sufficient pleading and proof of each element.48 In New Jersey,
43

New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13(f) (West 2002) (“In any civil action
commenced pursuant to any provision of this code the burden of proof shall be
by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
45
Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001), citing Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129 (N.J.
1999).
46
GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 55
(1996) (“In a typical civil case, a party must prove the elements of his claim
by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
47
For a thorough analysis of the potential “chilling effect” of defamation
law upon First Amendment rights and proposals for reform, see David Boies,
The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible
Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207 (1995).
48
See generally James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 381, 384-92 (1985). Pielemeier reviews the variations in state
defamation laws and examines the constitutional questions that arise in
selecting the applicable law in multi-state publication and litigation. Id. His
44
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principles of common law along with Constitution-based
decisions of the United States Supreme Court govern libel and
slander.49 Apart from the statute of limitations, only three
statutory provisions deal expressly with the law of defamation in
New Jersey.50 One provision delineates the nature and extent of
the privilege attaching to “the publication of judicial or other
proceedings;”51 a second limits the amount of damages
recoverable from print media defendants in the absence of
malice;52 and a third relieves a broadcaster from liability for
statements made by a candidate for public office under specified
circumstances.53
In New Jersey, plaintiffs are advised to consider a number of
factors when drafting a complaint for defamation.54 Among those
items are residence of the plaintiff and other jurisdictional facts,
the making of the alleged defamatory statement, the publication
of the defamatory statement, the inducement, when the statement

article ultimately proposes a model for the choice of law in defamation
actions. Id. at 434-40.
49
Introductory Comments, 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 23:1 (1997). The
Supreme Court subjected the law of defamation to the regulation of the First
Amendment for the first time in 1964. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
50
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 2002). The statute requires that an
action for defamation be commenced within one year of publication. Id.
51
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-1 (West 2002). Newspapers may publish
official statements by police department heads and county prosecutors on
investigations in progress or ones completed by them that are accepted in good
faith by the publisher. The privileged character of the statements will be a
good defense to any libel action, unless malice in fact is shown. Id.
52
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 2002). Only actual damages may be
recovered from print media defendants in the absence of malice in fact or
failure to retract the libelous charge publicly and within a reasonable time after
having been requested to do so by plaintiff. Id.
53
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-3 (West 2002) A broadcaster is relieved
from liability for statements made by a legally qualified candidate for public
office when the broadcast is made under provisions of federal law denying the
broadcaster the power to censor. Id.
54
See 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS, Checklist—Matters to Consider When
Drafting Complaint for Defamation, § 23:2 (West 1997).
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complained of is not actionable per se,55 and an averment of
general damages resulting from the publication complained of or
an averment of special damages, when the matter complained of
is not defamatory per se.56 In short, a plaintiff is required to
articulate his or her claim by specifying the statement claimed to
be defamatory, the context and communication of the statement,
an explanation of how the plaintiff was affected by the statement,
and the damage inflicted by the statement.57
Like many jurisdictions, New Jersey applies a higher burden
of proof when the plaintiff in a defamation suit is a public
figure.58 In these instances, there must be proof “that the
statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether
or not it was false.”59 This strict standard applies because the
public has an interest in obtaining knowledge about public
figures, and thus such figures should expect information of their
lives and activities to be broadly disseminated.60
The threshold issue in a defamation case is whether the
statement at issue is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory
meaning.61 It is for the court to determine whether a
55

In such a case, the actionable character of the defamatory statement and
the manner in which it affects the plaintiff should be shown. Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
The Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan is binding
on all lower courts and has been applied by state courts to require that public
plaintiffs meet the higher pleading and burden of proof standards established
therein. See, e.g., Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 2001). See generally Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Defamation: Application of New York Times and Related
Standards to Nonmedia Defendants, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1114 (1985); see also 3
N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS, supra note 54, at § 23:9.
59
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
60
Id. at 272-73, quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942)
(“The interest of the public [in cases that impose liability for reports of
conduct of officials] outweighs the interest of appellant or any other
individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but
information.”).
61
See Gray, 775 A.2d at 683, citing Decker v. Princeton Packet, 561
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communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning.62 To
make this determination, statements are construed together with
their context.63 If a published statement has only one meaning and
that meaning is defamatory, the statement is libelous as a matter
of law.64 Conversely, if the statement has only a non-defamatory
meaning, it cannot be considered libelous, thereby justifying
dismissal of the action.65 In cases, however, where the statement
is capable of being assigned more than one meaning, one of
which is defamatory and another that is not, the question of
whether its content is defamatory is resolved by the trier of fact.66
These basic rules seem straightforward at first glance, but in
fact there are “substantial hurdles” to successfully litigating a
defamation suit.67 Specifically, litigation is complicated when a
defendant moves for summary judgment prior to trial. When a
defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that a
statement is not defamatory, the question is presented to the

A.2d 1122, 1125 (1989); see also 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 23 supra note
54.
62
See Gray, 775 A.2d at 683 (“Initially, the question is one of law to be
decided by the court.”). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 616. (“The
court determines what items of harm suffered by the plaintiff as the result of
the publication of the defamatory matter may be considered by the jury in
assessing damages; the jury determines the amount of damages to be awarded
for those items.”). Additionally, “the meaning of a communication is that
which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it
was intended to express.” Id. § 563.
63
Id. § 616 cmt. d. Comment d. notes the following:
In determining the meaning of a communication, words, whether
written or spoken, are to be construed together with their context.
Words which standing alone may be reasonably understood as
defamatory may be so explained or qualified by their context as to
make such an interpretation unreasonable. So too, words which alone
are innocent may in their context clearly be capable of a defamatory
meaning and may be so understood.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. 1988).
66
Id. at 290-91.
67
Boies, supra note 47, at 1297.

WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC

HOMOSEXUALITY AS DEFAMATION

7/24/02 11:36 AM

647

judge as a preliminary concern.68 The judge, therefore, is the
initial arbiter to determine if a jury is required to settle a dispute.
Practically speaking, this means that a judge will decide whether
it is permissible for a jury to attach a defamatory meaning to a
given statement.69 The discretionary element of a potentially
defamatory meaning is not left entirely to the jury under these
circumstances, because a judge decides whether a question may
be submitted to the jury in the first instance.70
C. Imputations of Homosexuality as Defamation
The history of imputations of homosexuality as defamatory
has been exhaustively explored elsewhere.71 For the purposes of
this comment, a sampling of cases are used to illustrate the
conclusions reached in various jurisdictions.72 A number of state
courts have held that an imputation of homosexuality is
68

See infra Part I.B (noting that a threshold issue in any defamation suit
is whether the statements can be reasonably construed as defamatory and
pointing out the procedural aspects of a motion for summary judgment).
69
Judges determine whether an allegedly defamatory statement lowers the
plaintiff in the eyes of respectable people. See supra Part I.A. This
determination has been characterized as “an open invitation to judges to assess
which subgroups . . . are or are not worthy of the law’s attention . . . . the
judge can brand a community as unworthy of respect by either denying its
existence or by pronouncing it simply too antisocial for its values to be
countenanced.” Lidsky, supra note 8, at 20.
70
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 156-7 (N.J.
1995). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the motion judge
must consider whether the evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a
rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party. In a defamation action, the threshold issue is whether the
language used is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Id. See also
Decker v. Princeton Packet, 561 A.2d 1122, 1125 (N.J. 1989) (“Initially, the
question is one of law to be decided by the court.”).
71
See generally Janet Boeth James, Annotation, Imputation of
Homosexuality as Defamation, 3 A.L.R. 4th 752 (1981).
72
See infra notes 73, 74; see also infra Part III (analyzing a defamation
case from New South Wales, Australia and discussing the relative merits of
the approach employed).
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slanderous per se, actionable without proof of special damages.73
Alternatively, some courts have found such accusations
actionable as defamatory per quod and have required proof of
special damages.74 Although the United States Supreme Court has
not directly addressed this issue, the question of homosexuality as
defamation was tangentially addressed in at least two instances.75
Additionally, at least one court has found that to be called antihomosexual is defamatory.76 In short, there is no consensus on
the issue of whether an imputation of homosexuality is actionable
73

Defamation per se is “a statement that is defamatory in and of itself and
is not capable of an innocent meaning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th
ed. 1999). See, e.g., Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303
(Mo. 1993); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dept. 1964); Buck v.
Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959).
74
Defamation per quod is a statement that “either (1) is not apparent but
is proved by extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or (2) is
apparent but is not a statement that is actionable per se.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999). See, e.g., Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d
74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Bohdan v. Alltool Mtg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); Morrisette v. Beatte, 17 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1941).
75
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 65 n.7 (1966)
(declining to limit liability in labor disputes to “‘grave’ defamations–those
which accuse the defamed person of having engaged in criminal, homosexual,
treasonable or other infamous conduct”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that the majority opinion was too
broad because it held that no due process security would exist in a statute
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of allegedly defamatory
statements “so long as the statement was limited to the public condemnation
and branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an ‘active murderer,’ a
homosexual, or any other mark that ‘merely’ carries social opprobrium.” Id.
at 721.
76
Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 649 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio 1995). The
Ohio Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff, a candidate for state senator,
stated actionable claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on a newspaper columnist’s description of her as “dislik[ing]
homosexuals,” of “engag[ing] in an ‘anti-homosexual diatribe,’” and of
“foster[ing] homophobia” in an attempt to be elected. Id. at 184. The Ohio
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the columnist’s statements were
protected under the Ohio Constitution because they represented a point of view
that was “obviously subjective” and that “the ordinary reader would accept
[the] column as opinion and not as fact.” Id. at 184, 186.
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as defamatory.
D. Judicial Discretion in Defamation Actions
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled again that public figures
bringing suit for libel must provide clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice to avoid defendant’s summary judgment.77 Thus,
the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard must be applied
at the appellate as well as the trial level. In light of the necessary
balance between society’s interest in protecting individuals and
the interest in promoting free speech under the First Amendment,
the bar for a defamation claim is necessarily high and “because
non-meritorious defamation claims have a tendency to
compromise or chill the exercise of First Amendment values . . .
a court should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment if the
defamation claim lacks merit.”78 The extent to which defamation
law has a chilling effect upon the First Amendment cannot be
determined with any mathematical certainty. However, at least
one leading commentator was willing to declare that the effect is
“significant.”79 The First Amendment balancing test, therefore, is
rightfully considered alive and well in the courts.80
Considering the impact upon the media, allowing
homosexuality to remain on the list of legally offensive terms
may have the practical effect of deterring press coverage of the

77

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684-85 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
79
Boies, supra note 47, at 1208.
80
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255-56.
[W]hether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must
be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the
case. This is true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment
stages . . . where the factual dispute concerns actual malice . . . .
[T]he appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the
evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either
that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence or that the plaintiff has not.
Id.
78
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gay rights movement.81 In communities that have passed
legislation indicating an acceptance of homosexuality, the media
could justifiably conclude that threat of defamation suits arising
out of media coverage of gay events is lessened.82 Burdening
such media outlets with the “chill” of potential litigation would
therefore be unwarranted. Decisions in defamation suits that take
local and state legislation into account can facilitate the exercise
of free speech by sending a clear, consistent message from the
courtroom to the press room.
E. Gray in Context
The fact that defamation law exists to protect one’s
reputation, taken together with the contention that individual
plaintiffs in defamation suits are not primarily motivated by
economic recovery, supports a common understanding that
defamation suits generally arise when someone is hurt or angry.83
One can justifiably wonder, then, why a plaintiff who has
personally appeared in a number of gay pride events, and who
lives in a community with legislation that strives to eliminate
discrimination based on sexual orientation should be sufficiently
hurt and angry to pursue potentially costly litigation based on a
single statement that she is gay.84 It is also a mystery that a court
81

See Fogle, supra note 4, at 175 (noting that “the threat of defamation
claims has a similar ‘chilling effect’ on the naming of homosexuals”). As a
practical matter, it can be assumed that media outlets and resources would be
unwilling to provide news coverage of an event if that coverage carried with it
a probable risk of liability in subsequent defamation suits. The mainstream
press has consistently avoided naming individuals who have been “outed” by
the gay community, claiming a fear of libel litigation. Id. at 175. Fogle further
argues that “[t]he chilling effect that defamation suits have on the media
coverage of outing has dramatic societal implications including using
defamation suits (1) in the political arena and (2) to support attitudes that are
contrary to public policy.” Id. at 175.
82
Id. at 195.
83
See Boies, supra note 47, at 1209.
84
See discussion infra Part I.E.1. New Jersey legislation and caselaw are
remarkably protective of the rights of gays and lesbians under the law. For
discussion of Sally Starr’s participation in Gay Pride events, see infra Part II.
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that once stated that “[i]t is unquestionably a compelling interest
of this State to eliminate the destructive consequences of
discrimination from our society” and that evinced a desire to
“eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types”
would decline to further this goal when presented with the
opportunity to do so.85 This context of apparent inconsistencies
generated a judicial decree that now has the dubious distinction of
further confusing defamation law as well as detracting from an
effective, concerted effort to further equal protection for gays and
lesbians.86
1.

New Jersey Legislation

The legislative history and framework in New Jersey reflects
a long-standing effort to broaden the scope of the equal
protection doctrine. The New Jersey Legislature codified its
commitment to equality by enacting the Law Against
Discrimination (“LAD”) in 1945, “some twenty years before the
effective date of [federal anti-discrimination law] Title VII.”87
The LAD was amended in 1991 to include sexual orientation.88
New Jersey’s sodomy statute was repealed in 1979.89 The state’s
85

Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227, citing Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1978).
86
For further discussion of the residual effects of Gray on the clarity of
defamation law and gay rights, see infra Part II.B.3.
87
Peper, 389 A.2d at 478. See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-2000h-6
(West 2002).
88
NJ STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2002). The statute includes “affectional
or sexual orientation.” Id. It reads as follows:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons.
Id.
89
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:143-1, 2A:143-2 (repealed 1979). This is
relevant because some courts have relied on sodomy laws to conclude that an
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Unlawful Discrimination statute provides legal redress for
discrimination based on sexual orientation.90 The Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act affords the same protection to victims in
a same-sex relationship as in other relationships covered by the
act.91 New Jersey’s Hate Crimes Law includes sexual
orientation.92 At a minimum, New Jersey’s current legislative
framework clearly indicates a desire to protect the legal rights
and interests of lesbians and gays in the state.
Furthermore, the mission statement of the New Jersey Human
Relations Council includes “developing proposals for the State to
combat crime based on race, color, religion, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, gender, or physical, mental or cognitive disability.”93
The council assists other legislative bodies “in [their] efforts to
foster better community relations throughout the State.”94 The
executive committee of the council “shall include ten public
members who shall be representative of the various ethnic;
religious; national origin; racial; sexual orientation; gender; and
disabilities organizations [of the] state.”95 By establishing this
commission, the legislature not only codified the state’s desire to
“promote prejudice reduction,”96 but also explicitly welcomed—
indeed required—the inclusion of homosexuals in the state’s
representative government. The commission was charged with
the mission to eliminate “all types of discrimination” by fostering
imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se because it infers the
commission of a crime. See Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex.
1980); Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959). At least
one member of the current New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that “the
1979 repudiation of New Jersey’s sodomy statutes . . . is further evidence of
the evolution in social thinking about homosexuality.” Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1244 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring).
90
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002).
91
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 (West 2002).
92
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7 (West 2002).
93
See N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:9DD-8 (West 2002). The committee was
established by statute in 1997 to perform planning and coordinating functions
in conjunction with other legislative organizations. Id.
94
Id.
95
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8(b) (West 2002).
96
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8(a) (West 2002).
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“good will, cooperation and conciliation among the groups and
elements of the inhabitants of the community.”97
2. Sexual Orientation in New Jersey Courts
New Jersey caselaw reveals a similar desire to promote equal
protection of gay and lesbians in the state. New Jersey courts
have “recognized the arbitrariness of discriminating against
individuals solely because of their sexual orientation.”98 The high
court recently reiterated that “New Jersey has always been in the
vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful
discrimination of all types from our society.”99 This same opinion
declared that New Jersey has “long been a leader” in combating
the problems faced by gays and lesbians in society.100 Although
the following list is by no means exhaustive, there are a number
of landmark cases that illustrate the New Jersey courts’
commitment to preventing discrimination based on sexual
orientation and promoting equal protection for gays and lesbians
under the law.101
As early as 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted
that the “[f]undamental rights of parents may not be denied,

97

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-10 (West 2002).
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1228, citing One Eleven
Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d 12,
18-19 (1967). In One Eleven Wines & Liquors, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the suspension and revocation of liquor licenses to three
establishments patronized by “apparent homosexuals.” One Eleven Wines &
Liquors, 235 A.2d at 19. The opinion is not entirely a beacon of flattery for
gays and lesbians, considering the inclusion of a statement that “in our culture
homosexuals are indeed unfortunates,” but the court did find unpersuasive the
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control’s argument that permitting “apparent
homosexuals” to congregate at a bar threatened public welfare. Id. at 18.
99
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227, citing Peper, 389 A.2d at 478.
100
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227.
101
See, e.g., Dale, 734 A.2d at 1196; V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539
(N.J. 2000); In re Change of Name by: Jill Iris Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001.); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777
A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
98
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limited or restricted on the basis of sexual orientation, per se.”102
New Jersey was the first state in the nation to specify that gay
and unmarried couples will be measured by the same adoption
standards as married couples, and that no couple will be barred
from adopting because of their sexual orientation or marital
status.103 Recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied the
“psychological parent” doctrine to allow a biological mother’s
same-sex former domestic partner to qualify as a statutory
“parent” so that the former partner was entitled to visitation

102

In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1974), aff’d, 362
A.2d 54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976). In a dispute between mother and
father over the extent of divorced father’s visitation rights, the court held that
granting visitation rights to homosexual father would serve the best interests of
the children. Id. It should be noted, however, that the court imposed a
limitation on the father’s visitation rights based on a finding that “the lack of
understanding and controversy which surrounds homosexuality, together with
the immutable effects which are engendered by the parent-child relationship,
demands that the court be most hesitant in allowing any unnecessary exposure
of a child to an environment which may be deleterious.” Id. at 97.
103
See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay
and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 540
(1999) (“In a 1997 settlement of a class action law suit, New Jersey became
the first state in the country with a written agency policy requiring that gay,
lesbian, and unmarried heterosexual couples be evaluated for joint adoption of
children using the same criteria used for married couples.”). See also Press
Release, ACLU, New Jersey Becomes First State to Allow Joint Adoption by
Lesbian and Gay Couples (Dec. 17, 1997), available at http://www.aclu.
org/news/n121797a.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002); Press Release, Gay and
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), New Jersey Press Does
Justice to Gay Marriage (June 25, 1998), available at http://www.glaad.
org/org/publications/alerts/index.html?record=954 (last visited Apr. 13,
2002). In a 1997 judgment, attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union
reached an agreement with New Jersey to allow lesbian and gay couples to
adopt children on equal footing with married couples. Id. For additional samesex adoption cases, see, e.g., In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666
A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (permitting “any person” to
institute action for adoption allows unmarried person, heterosexual or
homosexual, to adopt (construing N.J.S.A. 9:3-43(a)); In re Adoption of
Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (granting
lesbian’s petition to adopt biological child of her partner with a conclusion that
the adoption would be in child’s best interest).
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rights with the children the couple had raised during their
partnership.104 By acknowledging the parental and familial rights
of gays and lesbians, New Jersey courts have expressed an
interest in protecting homosexual relationships.105
In Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems106 a unanimous
three-judge panel of the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that
an individual who encounters employment discrimination because
she is transgendered may have a claim under the state’s LAD.107
104

V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); see also Press Release,
ACLU, Recognizing Lesbian and Gay Family Relationships, N.J. Appeals
Court Grants Visitation Rights to Woman’s Former Partner (Mar. 8, 1999),
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n030899d.html (last visited Apr.
13, 2002).
105
See generally Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 107, 110-12 (1996).
Ettelbrick noted the following:
The struggle of lesbian and gay parents to hold on to custody of and
visitation with their children has moved many courts to reject
outlandish stereotypes and to acknowledge that one’s sexual
orientation is not a predictor of parental ability. A growing number of
courts and employers have begun to acknowledge the integrity of
lesbian and gay family relationships by embracing concepts such as
‘second parent adoption’ and ‘domestic partnership.’ Furthermore,
courts have extended the definition of ‘family’ to include lesbian and
gay couples, and the relationships between non-biological lesbian
parents and the children they raise with their partners have
increasingly gained recognition in the contexts of adoption,
guardianship and custody.
Id.
106
777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
107
Id. The trial court rejected plaintiff’s claim on the ground that gender
dysphoria could not be a handicap under the LAD. The appellate court first
detailed what the record disclosed concerning the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria
or transsexualism, and stated the following:
Essentially, plaintiff claimed that she felt like a woman trapped in a
man’s body from a very early age, and that she was called upon to act
manly even though she did not feel masculine. This is consistent with
general clinical findings regarding other transsexuals. Transsexuals
do not alternate between gender roles; rather, they assume a fixed
role of attitudes, feelings, fantasies, and choices consonant with those
of the opposite sex, all of which clearly date back to early
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This case is especially relevant because although the LAD bars
discrimination on the basis of “sex,” the “definitions” section of
the statute does not include transgendered individuals.108
Additionally, the plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination was
distinct from sex discrimination claims covered by the LAD.109
The court found other state courts’ decisions excluding
transsexuals’ gender discrimination claims “too constricted”110
and adopted a reading that “sex discrimination under the LAD
includes gender discrimination so as to protect the plaintiff from
gender stereotyping and discrimination for transforming herself
from a man to a woman.”111 It is interesting to note that the court
revived language used in a 1976 case, stating that “a person’s sex
or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, that is, one’s selfimage, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual
identity and character.”112 This explicit recognition of sexuality as
a component of one’s psychological makeup and identity
indicates that New Jersey courts view sexual orientation as
encompassing more than behavior or sexual activity. This
analysis is more comprehensive than some courts have been
willing to recognize.113
development.
Id. at 370 (internal citations omitted).
The case was remanded for trial both on plaintiff’s gender discrimination
claim as well as for further determination on whether or not plaintiff had
gender dysphoria and whether her condition was medically diagnosed to
qualify as a handicap. Id. at 377.
108
See 10 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 85A:3 (1996), Employment Relations
Chapter 85A. Discrimination. “‘Affectional or sexual orientation’ means male
or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination,
practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or being perceived,
presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation.” Id.; see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(hh), Law Against Discrimination Definitions (West
2002).
109
Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 377.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 378.
112
Id., citing M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
113
See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 181-82. Some courts have
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The plaintiff in Enriquez also brought an action under the
portion of the LAD that provides relief for those who suffer
unlawful discrimination because of a handicap.114 The court
began by noting that the state’s LAD should be liberally
construed,115 containing fewer restrictions than the correlating
federal statute.116 Accordingly, the court determined that New
Jersey’s legislature did not preclude protection to those with
gender dysphoria.117 Turning again to other jurisdictions, the
distinguished between sexual orientation and the acts, whether sexual or
otherwise, that are associated with that orientation, thus declining to state
explicitly that sexual orientation is an intrinsic part of one’s identity and
psychological constitution. Id. at 182. (characterizing this as a means of sidestepping the “difficult issue” in defamation cases and citing, for illustration,
Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959), and Mazart v. State,
441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981)).
Federal cases construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in light
of sexual harassment claims based on gender stereotypes are also highly
illustrative on this point. Readers interested in this topic are encouraged to
examine Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and its progeny.
See generally Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the
Gender Police—Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender
Nonconformists Is a Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1999).
114
Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 379 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001). The relevant statute in Enriquez was N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-5(q). Specifically, the court interpreted and applied the portion that
provides a person can be handicapped if he or she suffers from “mental,
psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the
normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable,
medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Id. at 379.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 380, comparing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b)(1). The Americans
with Disabilities Act expressly excludes “transvestitism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments, and other sexual behavior disorders.” Id. at 380.
117
Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 376 (“Thus, gender dysphoria is a recognized
mental or psychological disability that can be demonstrated psychologically by
accepted clinical diagnostic techniques and qualifies as a handicap under the
LAD.”). For the definition of gender dysphoria set forth by the court, see
supra note 107.
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court noted a “split on this issue” in other states,118 and reiterated
that New Jersey’s statute should be construed to “eradicate the
evil of discrimination in New Jersey.”119 The court also referred
to current understanding and approaches to gender dysphoria by
psychiatrists and medical practitioners.120 This willingness to
acknowledge new trends in other professional fields aided the
court’s conclusion that gender dysphoria qualifies as a handicap
under the LAD.121 This illustrates the merits of judicial decisions
that incorporate contemporary, evolving research on, and
acceptance of, issues pertaining to sexual orientation.
In 2001, the New Jersey appeals court overturned a lower
court ruling and allowed a lesbian to hyphenate her name to
include that of her same-sex partner.122 In Bacharach, the court
remarked that although public policy judgments are essentially
irrelevant to application for change of name, “to the extent that
public policy may be gleaned from the actions of our legislature
and the decisions of our Supreme Court, [there is] no basis for
declining a name change which would enable an applicant to
adopt a hyphenated surname to include the name of her same-sex
partner.”123 Moreover, the court explicitly stated that, in light of
current legislation and judicial decrees, the legitimacy of samesex relationships is “well established by both statutory and
decisional law.”124 Thus, analysts of the New Jersey Court of
Appeals can conclude that judges are likely to look toward
legislation to ensure that their decisions comply with the state’s
public policy, even when those decisions are admittedly not
founded in policy considerations.
Perhaps the most notable example of the New Jersey court’s
progressive approach towards homosexuality is the Supreme

118

Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 380.
Id. at 10.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
In re Change of Name by: Jill Iris Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
123
Id. at 584.
124
Id.
119
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Court’s decision in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America.125 Although
the critical question in deciding whether the Boy Scouts violated
the LAD by terminating Dale’s membership was whether the Boy
Scouts may be deemed a “place of public accommodation,”126 the
state supreme court gave substantial consideration to legislative
history and intent as it pertained to furthering fundamental
equality and protection of the rights of gays and lesbians in the
state.127 The court noted that, “at a most fundamental level,
adherence to the principle of equality demands that our legal
system protect the victims of invidious discrimination . . . . New
Jersey has long been a leader in this effort.”128 Construing the
state’s LAD to cover sexual orientation, they found that “the
scope of the statute is reflective of the breadth of the underlying
problems we face as a society.”129 The language and spirit of
Dale can be reasonably interpreted as indicating the court’s
interest in placing the state at the forefront of gay rights. That the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision was ultimately reversed by
the United States Supreme Court further illustrates that the state’s
courts and legislature seek to provide more protection to gays and
lesbians than other jurisdictions.130
II. GRAY CLOUD OVER THE RAINBOW
Sally Starr Gray, also known as “Our Gal Sal,” has been in

125

Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). Dale has
been the subject of a substantial amount of scholarly writing entirely beyond
the scope of this comment. This reference to the case highlights the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis as illustrative of the Court’s position on gays
and lesbians in the state.
126
Id. at 1208.
127
Id. at 1207-30. Chief Justice Poritz’s majority opinion in Dale
provides a comprehensive, thorough analysis of the state’s LAD as it intersects
with the State and Federal Constitution, as well as how the LAD had been
construed in prior decisions to effectuate legislative intent. Id.
128
Id. at 1227.
129
Id. at 1227 n.15.
130
Id.
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show business since the early 1940s.131 In recent years, she has
complemented her career as an entertainer with personal
appearances at numerous public events, including events hosted
by gay and lesbian rights groups and AIDS organizations.132 The
incident that gave rise to Gray v. Press Communications involved
a call-in radio show broadcast on a New Jersey radio station.133
On July 24, 1998, the show focused on children’s television
shows and callers were asked to discuss their favorite childhood
program.134 One caller identified the Sally Starr show as one of
her two favorite shows, and co-host Jeff Diminski commented,
“That was the lesbian cowgirl I think.”135 When she learned of
the comment, Starr immediately contacted the program director
and complained.136 Diminski then retracted the statement.137
Despite this apology, Starr filed suit claiming that the broadcast
defamed her.

131

For a colorful and flattering synopsis of Ms. Starr’s illustrious career,
see “Sally Starr—Biographical Profile,” available at http://www.sallystarrshow.com/biography.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002) (hereinafter
Biographical Profile).
132
See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Respondents at Da2-5, Gray v.
Press Communications, LLC., 775 A.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2001)
(No. A-004797-99T5) (hereinafter Respondent’s Brief).
133
The show was co-hosted by Jeff Diminski, who was also named as a
defendant in the action, and broadcast on FM 101.5, which was licensed by
Press Communications, LLC. Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d
678, 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
134
Id. at 681.
135
Diminiski reiterated, “The lesbian cowgirl, Sally Starr.” For a full
transcript of the relevant exchange, see id.
136
Id.at 682.
137
Specifically, Diminski stated, “It has been very informative today. We
have learned about sex offenders’ rights. We learned about diamonds. We
learned that Sally Starr is not a lesbian.” Id. This retraction is relevant because
New Jersey state law requires that a plaintiff prove either “malice in fact or
that defendant, after having been requested by plaintiff in writing to retract the
libelous charge in as public a manner as that in which it was made, failed to
do so within a reasonable time, shall recover only his actual damage proved
and specially alleged.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 2002).
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A. Gray Road to the Courthouse
Sally Starr was born in Kansas City, Missouri on January 25,
1923.138 She made her show business debut when she was twelve
years old and sang and performed, primarily for live audiences,
until the late 1940s when she began a career in broadcast radio.139
Starr’s television career began in 1950 when she began hosting
the daily children’s show “Popeye Theater.”140 In the mid-1960s
Starr expanded her career to include appearances in feature films,
audio recordings, and a series of children’s stories published in
conjunction with her television program.141 “Popeye Theater”
was cancelled in 1971.142 Starr’s career currently consists of
making personal appearances and hosting a three-hour country
classic radio show.143 Starr has also made public appearances at
various gay pride events.144
138

See Biographical Profile, supra note 131. Her parents were Charles
and Bertha Beller. She changed her name legally to Sally Starr in 1941. Id.
139
In addition to recording commercials for the Pepsi-Cola Company,
Starr and her husband performed on radio programs such as “Hayloft HoeDown,” which was broadcast from the old Town Hall in Center City
Philadelphia. Id.
140
The show was broadcast out of Philadelphia. The format consisted of
cartoons, comedy acts, and live appearances by such entertainers as Roy
Rogers and Dale Evans, Chuck Connors, Dick Clark, Jerry Lewis, Tim
Conway, Jimmy Durante, Nick Adams, and The Three Stooges. Id.
141
Starr appeared in “The Outlaws are Coming,” the last feature film to
be made by The Three Stooges at Columbia Pictures, and had roles in such
movies as “The In Crowd,” “Mannequin On the Move,” and “Holiday
Journey.” She also performed with Bill Haley and the Comets and recorded
country and western music on the Haley’s label, Clymax. Id.
142
Id.
143
See Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 680-81 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Starr regularly appears at Folk and Family music
festivals and parades in the New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania area.
For an updated list of appearances, or to secure a personal appearance of Ms.
Starr at your business location or event, see http://www.sallystarrshow.
com/appearances.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002). Ms. Starr’s radio show is
broadcast from Vineland, N.J. on 92.1 FM WVLT. See http://www.
sallystarrshow.com/whatsnew.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002).
144
Gray, 775 A.2d at 681. The opinion noted as follows:
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Prior to trial, a preliminary hearing was conducted to address
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.145 Starr’s attorney
conceded that she is a public figure and the judge determined that
she could not prevail without meeting the higher standard of
“demonstrat[ing] by clear and convincing evidence, that
defendant’s statement was accompanied by actual malice.”146 The
trial judge did not address the question of whether or not an
imputation of homosexuality is defamatory.147 Rather, the judge
was convinced by defense counsel’s construction of the actual
malice standard as requiring “reckless disregard” and a “high
degree of awareness of probable falsity of the statement.”148
Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to discredit Diminski’s basis for
belief that Starr was a lesbian,149 while defense counsel posited
that the high burden of proof did not allow for a flexible standard
and was not met.150 Because the record did not establish malice
[Starr] also did personal appearances for the AIDS Foundation . . . .
She also stated that she appeared in the Philadelphia Gay Pride
Parade, where her participation was limited to riding on the back of a
convertible and waving to people. Additionally, she made several
paid appearances at an outdoor festival in Philadelphia, held in
connection with the Gay Pride festivities.
Id. The irony of this was not lost on all commentators. See, e.g., Arthur S.
Leonard, ‘Lesbian’ Still Defames in New Jersey, LGNY, NEWSPAPER FOR
LESBIAN & GAY N.Y., July 9-19, 2001.
145
Gray, 775 A.2d at 682. In this context, malice requires that the
statement was made “with knowledge of the probable falsity of the statement.”
Id.
146
Id.
147
See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 4-6. It should be noted here
that both respondent’s brief and respondent’s petition record the spelling of
defendant’s name as “Jeff Deminki,” while the spelling used in the court’s
opinion is “Diminski.” For purposes of clarity and consistency, this comment
uses the spelling employed by the court.
148
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at Da4.
149
Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Diminski “found out at a cocktail party.
He was washing his car, someone made a comment to him. He was at a
comedy club and he thought he heard something. These were the basis [sic] of
his belief, if it was actually worthy of belief.” Id. at Da3.
150
Defense counsel stated, “My colleague says that the reckless disregard
standard is a mutable standard, is a flexible standard, but it is not, Your
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“by anything close to clear and convincing evidence,” summary
judgment was granted.151
On appeal, Starr argued both that the term “lesbian cowgirl”
was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and that a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Diminski knew his
statement was false.152 Despite the fact that plaintiff’s first
contention was not ruled upon by the trial court, the appellate
division examined Starr’s claim and agreed that an accusation of
homosexuality is actionable as defamatory.153 The case was
remanded on the determination that a reasonable fact-finder could
conclude that Diminski’s actions constituted actual malice.154 This
decision, however, precludes future defendants from arguing that
an accusation of homosexuality is not defamatory because further
proceedings cannot be inconsistent with the appellate division’s
opinion.155 Moreover, the defendant’s petition for certification of
the decision was denied.156

Honor.” Id.
151
Id. at Da4-5.
152
See Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 681 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). At his deposition, Diminski mentioned three
occasions in which he had heard plaintiff was a self-identified lesbian, though
he was unable to identify the individuals who made these statements. Id.
153
This is significant because it is a well-settled practice that appellate
courts may decline to address an issue if it was not ruled upon in the first
instance by the motion judge. Gray, 775 A.2d at 685, citing Subcarrier
Comm’n, Inc. v. Day, 691 A.2d 876, 882-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997).
154
Gray, 775 A.2d at 686, cert. denied, 788 A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001).
155
Id. It should also be noted that, by virtue of stare decisis, the court’s
statements on this question are binding upon lower courts throughout the state.
As such, any discussion or further analysis of this matter in New Jersey’s
court systems is effectively shut down by the court’s minimal treatment of the
matter. For further discussion, see infra Part II.3.
156
Gray, 775 A.2d 678, cert. denied, 788 A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001).
Defendant’s Petition for Certification of and Appeal from Final Judgment with
the Supreme Court of New Jersey was denied without opinion. Id.
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B. Gray, Not Black and White

Gray addressed whether an imputation of homosexuality
could be defamatory as a matter of first impression for New
Jersey courts.157 As such, there was no controlling precedent, and
the court was entitled to arrive at whatever conclusion it deemed
appropriate. Confronted with the same question, many courts
have assessed contemporary social mores by way of local and
state legislation.158 The Gray court did not mention New Jersey’s
legislative framework, and instead looked to six other
jurisdictions’ opinions on this issue for guidance.159 The court’s
reliance upon these decisions, however, was inherently flawed.
Of those decisions, three were issued in states that either still
have sodomy laws or had sodomy laws at the time of the
decision.160 Furthermore, opinions that it found persuasive rested
157

Gray, 775 A.2d at 683-84 (“Our research has failed to disclose a case
in New Jersey considering whether an accusation of homosexuality is
defamatory.”).
158
See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(reversing trial court decision that imputation of homosexuality was slander
per se and finding “no empirical evidence in [the] record demonstrating that
homosexuals are held by society in such poor esteem”). To support this
contention, the court referred to the repeal of the state’s sodomy law, an
executive order prohibiting anti-gay discrimination in public employment, as
well as nondiscrimination ordinances in Denver and Boulder, Colorado. Id. at
1025. The case was remanded to determine whether, in the context that it was
made, the statement was defamatory at all. Id. at 1026.
159
Without indicating why it selected these cases, the court cited Thomas
v. Bet Sound Stage Restaurant/Brett Co., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D. Md.
1999); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Moricoli v.
Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Bohdan v. Alltool Mtg. Co.,
411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College,
860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.
1980). See also Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
160
This inconsistency was brought to the attention of the supreme court in
defendant’s petition for certification. See Brief in Support of Appeal and
Petition for Certification of Defendants-Petitioners/Appellant at 17-18, Gray
v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
2001) (No. 51,813) (hereinafter Petition).
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upon archaic reasoning that New Jersey’s state law rejected years
ago.161
As explained above, the community in which a statement is
uttered uniquely governs the boundaries of defamation law.162 It
has long been noted that changes in social sensibilities as well as
varying judicial attitudes in the fifty plus jurisdictions—federal
and state—account for sharp contradictions and controversy in the
determination of what is or is not defamatory.163 Therefore, while
it is conceivable that decisions from other courts correctly reflect
the public policy of those jurisdictions, opinions of
homosexuality vary depending on the region of the country.164
For example, one could, at the very least, expect that the opinion
commonly held about homosexuality in Texas in 1980 would
differ drastically from that in New Jersey in 2001.165 So
illustrated, the potential for substantial variation in public policy
between states and across decades surely renders the persuasive
value of certain defamation decisions questionable at best. The
Gray court’s decision neither explored what motivated the out-ofstate decisions nor indicated why they would be persuasive.166
Because defamation suits purport to provide an opportunity to
For a complete, current list of State sodomy laws, see American Civil
Liberties Union, State by State Breakdown of Sodomy Laws, available at
http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
161
New Jersey’s sodomy law was repealed in 1979. See supra note 89.
162
Fogle, supra note 4, at 172.
Therefore, finding that a statement is defamatory at a particular place
and time should not govern the determination of whether a similar
statement is defamatory at a different place and time. Instead, the
impact a particular statement is likely to have on a plaintiff’s
reputation should be considered in the context in which it is
published.
Id.
163
MAYER, supra note 11, at 34.
164
Fogle, supra note 4, at 179.
165
This analogy is not arbitrarily drawn. Of the six cases referenced, the
Gray court cited to a 1980 case from the Texas Court of Appeals. See supra
note 159; see also Gray, 775 A.2d at 684.
166
As noted, the court cited to the cases without explaining why they
were selected. Gray, 775 A.2d at 684.
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vindicate one’s harmed reputation, it is essential that courts
identify the plaintiff’s community and its norms to gauge the
interaction between the statement uttered and values of the
audience.167 This does not necessarily render extra-jurisdictional
opinions entirely irrelevant, but it does indicate that sound
judicial opinions cannot be furnished in utter absence of
contextual analysis.
It is equally well established that the existence of a judicial
remedy for injury to reputation is entirely a matter of state law.168
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s
“interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State
may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a
forum for vindication of those interests by means of damages
actions.”169 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also explicitly
rejected the proposition that the state constitution creates a right
to maintain a defamation action.170 Therefore, to the extent that a
New Jersey court chooses to authorize a cause of action for
defamation, it may also limit a plaintiff’s ability to prove his or
her claim in order to promote other social purposes without
regard to other states’ conclusions.171
1. New Jersey Legislation Regarding Sexual Orientation
Judicial opinions often refer to state and local legislation to
determine whether public statements are actionable as
defamatory.172 There is substantial reason to give great weight to
167

Lidksy, supra note 8, at 1.
Maressa v. N.J. Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 384 (N.J. 1982).
169
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Since Paul v. Davis, federal
courts have noted that “the State has created the [defamation] cause of action
and hence . . . it can limit, modify or perhaps take it away through the
operation of testimonial privileges, absent any claim of constitutional
deprivation.” Mazzella v. Phila. Newspapers, 479 F. Supp. 523, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
170
Maressa, 445 A.2d at 384-385.
171
Id.
172
See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (examining state and local human rights codes and concluding that “the
168
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gay rights legislation to determine community acceptance of
homosexuality. At least one author has argued that gay rights
laws indicate both the community’s desires to fully incorporate
gays and lesbians into the community, as well as a condemnation
of homophobic behavior.173 It is not unrealistic to conclude that
legislation passed by popularly elected representatives reflects
those legislators’ desire to further the governmental interest that
the law serves.174 The long-standing existence of gay rights laws
may illustrate a community’s commitment to such issues and
indicate the community’s acceptance of homosexuality.175 Thus,
in communities with comprehensive gay rights protection, any
harm to one’s reputation suffered by an imputation of
homosexuality would not be inflicted by a majority of citizens
and could be disregarded as negligible by courts.176

community view toward homosexuals is mixed”); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 312
(pointing to same-sex sodomy statute to conclude that “despite the efforts of
many homosexual groups to foster greater tolerance and acceptance,
homosexuality is still viewed with disfavor, if not outright contempt, by a
sizeable proportion of our population”); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d
572, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that state sodomy statute applies
equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals and concluding that referring to a
person as gay is not tantamount to imputing the commission of a crime).
173
See Fogle, supra note 4, at 188.
174
See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38 (D.C. 1987) (finding that the Council of
the District of Columbia “acted on the most pressing of needs when
incorporating into the Human Rights Act its view that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is a grave evil that damages society as well as its immediate
victims. The eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling
governmental interest.”). In Gay Rights Coalition, the court reversed the trial
court’s ruling that relieved Georgetown University of its statutory obligation to
provide tangible benefits without regard to sexual orientation. Id. at 39; see
also Fogle, supra note 4, at 185 (“The relevance of state and city laws to
determine the defamatory nature of the imputation of homosexuality is
predicated upon the concept that the laws of a given jurisdiction reflect the
moral values of that jurisdiction.”).
175
Fogle, supra note 4, at 189.
176
See Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g Co., 167 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1929)
(concerning the publication of a newspaper article that contained errors about
Palestinian customs, which only people knowledgeable about such customs
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The Gray court did not refer to New Jersey legislation to
determine community standards on sexual orientation,177 although
the decision noted society’s increasing acceptance of freely
exercising one’s sexual preferences.178 Neither did the court
examine whether the statement actually injured the plaintiff.179
Yet, the decision now includes homosexuality in the category of
defamatory statements, regardless of legislative intent. Indeed,
the entire issue was disposed of in a single paragraph.180 Because
defamation law is designed to protect a person’s reputation, the
defamatory nature of a comment must be properly evaluated in
terms of the person’s reputation in the community.181 Courts do a
disservice to the clarity of defamation law when the question of
how homosexuality harms one’s reputation is not given full
treatment.182
If the Gray court had examined the state laws, it would not
would likely recognize and thus conclude that plaintiff was a “fraudulent
ignoramus”). See also Fogle, supra note 4, at 188.
177
Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001). After examining how accusations of homosexuality have
been treated by other jurisdictions, the court conclusively stated that
“[a]lthough society has come a long way in recognizing a person’s right to
freely exercise his or her sexual preferences, unfortunately, the fact remains
that a number of citizens still look upon homosexuality with disfavor.” Id. at
684.
178
Id.
179
Interestingly, if the court had examined this issue, it would have found
that although Ms. Starr’s complaint sought five million dollars in damages,
she claimed to have lost no more than $8,000 in cancelled personal appearance
contracts. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 9.
180
See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 9.
181
A similar argument has been made to critique judicial analysis holding
that because homosexual activity may indicate a lack of chastity in a woman,
imputation of homosexuality was slanderous without proof of damages. Fogle,
supra note 4, at 183, citing Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 666 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980).
182
Fogle, supra note 4, at 180-84. Fogle further argues that some courts
have side-stepped the question of how homosexuality damages one’s reputation
and have disposed of the question by other mechanisms, such as misapplying
sodomy laws to equate homosexuality to criminal or other distasteful behavior.
Id.
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have found support for their conclusion “that a number of
citizens still look upon homosexuality with disfavor.”183 As noted
above, New Jersey adopted anti-discrimination laws well before
the federal government,184 and the legislature has drafted statutes
that explicitly protect the rights of gays and lesbians in the state
in myriad areas.185 Americans commonly assume that legislation
passed by popularly elected representatives embodies the will of
the majority, if not the populace at large.186
Specifically, laws prohibiting bias reflect a community’s
unwillingness to tolerate such behavior. This begs the question
whether is it truly harmful to reputation to charge variance from
heterosexual practices, while at the same time society establishes
laws forbidding discrimination for such orientation.187 At the very
least, the legal status of gays and lesbians in New Jersey is
relevant in determining whether the community has accepted
homosexuals as a group.188 Moreover, if New Jersey’s Law
183

Gray, 775 A.2d at 684.
See supra Part I.E.1 (contrasting New Jersey’s LAD with Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law Title VII).
185
See supra Part I.E.1. See also Chris Bull, New Jersey Enacts Nation’s
Fifth State Bias Ban, ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 15 (reporting that New
Jersey passed a gay rights bill in housing, employment, public
accommodations, credit and public contracts).
186
See generally Nan D. Hunter, Sexual and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 565, 567 (2000).
Hunter suggests that progress in equality rights is a product of movements and
campaigns that in turn establish the cultural dynamics of equality statutes. Id.
She further states that “[w]hen legislatures extend the civil rights model to a
new group, a powerful sense of social legitimacy is conferred. This sense of
legitimacy develops, in part, because legislation can be enacted only after the
group has reached a certain level of social acceptance.” Id. at 567. See also
Fogle, supra note 4, at 185-92 (discussing the relevance of gay rights
legislation as a reflection of popular attitudes towards homosexuality).
187
Fogle, supra note 4, at 186-87. Fogle argues that, “although the law
cannot prohibit individual prejudice, it can prohibit discriminatory behavior . .
. . Eradicating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation indicates a
compelling interest on the part of the jurisdiction adopting such a statute to
protect the status of gays and lesbians.” Id.
188
Id. at 192. Fogle notes that “using the legal status of a group of people
to determine whether a statement is defamatory has been applied in other
184
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Against Unlawful Discrimination is meant to have any teeth, its
very existence must be read to indicate that residents have
decided to treat gays, lesbians and heterosexuals equally.189 In
short, the legislative intent is to dismiss precisely the type of
opinions that Gray tacitly permits, if not rewards.190 Judicial
declaration that homosexuality harms one’s reputation is
therefore entirely antithetical to the will of the majority as
expressed in legislation.
2. Progressive Judicial Decisions in New Jersey Caselaw
New Jersey caselaw simply does not support the court’s
decision in Gray. The cases explored in this comment provide a
brief look at the current supreme and appellate courts’ apparent
effort to provide progressive solutions to the problems gays,
lesbians, and transgendered people face in contemporary society.
Taken together, they indicate the cumulative effort expended by
New Jersey courts to combat homophobia and insure equal
protection in the state.191 Such an effort is frustrated by the oversimplified analysis in Gray that unnecessarily concluded that
homosexuality is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning
because “a number of citizens still look upon homosexuality with

subgroups within the general population.” Id., citing Ledsinger v. Burmeister,
318 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that calling someone a
“nigger” was not defamatory at all).
189
See Petition, supra note 160, at i. This contention was one of the two
main propositions advanced by the defendant in its petition for certification.
The other main argument was that the appellate division misapplied the
constitutionally imperative actual malice standard developed by the United
States and New Jersey Supreme Courts. See id. Defendants specifically stated
that “[i]gnoring New Jersey’s efforts to end discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, the appellate division erred in holding that an imputation of
homosexuality could be defamatory.” Id. at 16.
190
Allowing a defamation plaintiff to prevail has been considered the
equivalent of legally sanctioning the position asserted in his or her claim. See
infra Part I (discussing dismissal of certain claims to avoid condoning
discriminatory attitudes).
191
See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 186-87.
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disfavor.”192 These cases also bolster the legislative and statutory
analysis set forth in this comment. Taken together, they illustrate
that the state courts acknowledge legislation as a manifestation of
“public policy” in New Jersey, and that the highest court in the
state takes pride in maverick decisions affording broad protection
to gays and lesbians.193
A common justification for exercising judicial restraint on
policy issues is that proper redress should be achieved through
political venues and lobbying.194 This approach may be effective
when, for example, an individual seeks legislative change.195
When, as in Gray, however, the applicable legal standard is a
uniquely judicial determination,196 there is perhaps no alternate
means to affect the desired change.197 Thus, even lesbians and
gays who are active in legislative lobbying and advocacy groups
must presumptively stand idly by while courts sanction an
individual’s estimation of homosexuality as a negative
characteristic.198
192

Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 682 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
193
See supra Part II (discussing New Jersey cases and legislation that
further equal protection for gays and lesbians in the state).
194
One argument is that substantive changes in the law should be
achieved through the political process rather than by judicial fiat. See, e.g.,
Patrice S. Arend, Defamation in an Age of Political Correctness: Should a
False Public Statement That a Person Is Gay Be Defamatory?, 18 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 99, 114 (1997) (arguing that “[a]s society ‘evolves’ and recognizes
that homosexuality is not offensive, fewer cases will be brought to the courts .
. . . This allows the law to change gradually to serve the role of stimulating
social change, while at the same time doing what it is intended to do—protect
people.”).
195
This approach may be effective in cases where the desired remedy is
repealing, altering or amending an act of legislation. However, as noted, New
Jersey’s defamation law is not codified in statute and is therefore governed by
common law ideals and decisional law. See supra Part I.B.
196
See supra Part I.B (noting that it is for the court to determine whether
a communication is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning).
197
Whether or not a plaintiff is allowed to proceed with a defamation
claim is discretionary by the court. See supra Part I.B.
198
As previously discussed, the court determines whether a statement is
defamatory as a threshold issue. See supra Part I.B. Because this decision will

WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC

672

7/24/02 11:36 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

The New Jersey defamation law is not codified in a statute,
and is therefore uniquely amenable to judicial revisions.199 This
places an additional burden on courts to be more careful when
determining whether a statement is defamatory. The appellate
court in Gray had a real opportunity to inject an element of badly
needed intellectual rigor into caselaw on defamation. In an area
of the law containing “such anomalies and absurdities for which
no legal writer has had a kind word,”200 this would have been a
service not only to the state of New Jersey, but also to other
jurisdictions that may eventually have to decide the same issue.201
The decisions of other state courts that have casually interpreted
homosexuality in defamation cases could, therefore, mean
essentially nothing.
To be sure, some courts have not been eager to validate
progressive points of view in cases dealing with homosexuality.202
However, as noted above, New Jersey courts have certainly not
been adverse to rejecting out-of-state decisions construing
identical questions pertaining to sexual orientation.203 There is,
be made based on the judgment of the court, it is distinctly unlike legislative
initiatives and enactments, which may be affected by political lobbying and
voting constituent groups.
199
See supra Part I.B (explaining that New Jersey’s defamation law is
governed by common law ideals and judicial decree).
200
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771-72.
201
As noted, courts and commentators agree that defamation standards
change from one generation to the next. Some commentators have projected
that the time will arrive when stating that someone is gay or lesbian does not
reflect negatively upon their reputation. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 11, at
35; Arend, supra note 194, at 114 (stating that “as the gay community
becomes even more visible and achieves greater political power, the stigma
attached to homosexuality will undoubtedly disappear”).
202
See, e.g., supra notes 71-72 (citing cases which have found imputation
of homosexuality to be defamatory).
203
By the time Dale was litigated, other jurisdictions had applied narrow
definitions to public accommodation laws and found that the Boy Scouts did
not constitute a “place of public accommodation.” See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’g 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill.
1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993); Randall v. Orange County
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998); Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998);
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therefore, no reason why the New Jersey court should act as
though it is not in a position to be selective and judgmental when
it comes to accepting social prejudices. By treating as self-evident
that being falsely called a lesbian may be harmful to one’s
reputation, the Gray court implicitly condones homophobia.204
Sound judicial discretion should be applied to ensure that
defamation decisions comply with the state’s public policy. Given
that the current trend of the New Jersey courts is to liberally
construe state laws to provide legal redress to those who suffer
discrimination based on sexual orientation, Gray was inconsistent
and should have been reversed.
3. The Many Shades of Gray
To the extent that implications can be drawn from Gray, one
must consider the standards required to sustain a defamation
action as set forth above in conjunction with the role of judicial
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights
and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Seabourn v. Coronado Area
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); Schwenk v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976). See also Erica L. Stringer, Has the
Supreme Court Created a Constitutional Shield for Private Discrimination
Against Homosexuals? A Look at the Future Ramifications of Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (2001). In an analysis of the
future impacts of Dale on American constitutional litigations, the author noted
the following:
The Boy Scouts of America [“BSA”] has faced numerous court
challenges to its exclusionary membership policies under state public
accommodations laws. Through these challenges, brought on behalf
of girls, atheists, and homosexuals, four state supreme courts and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have held that BSA is
not a place of public accommodation. In a groundbreaking decision,
however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey departed from these
decisions in unanimously holding that BSA does fall within the scope
of New Jersey’s LAD.
Id.
204
In the same manner that upholding a defamation claim that a white
person is African-American would sanction racist beliefs, judicial recognition
of defamation suits based on an imputation of homosexuality sanctions
homophobia. See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 176.
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discretion.205 The thrust of this analysis concludes that allowing
defamation suits of this nature is tantamount to declaring
homosexuality offensive; it permits juries to award damages on a
necessary presumption that one is damaged by such
imputations.206 This position has been suggested elsewhere,207
though this comment takes a moderate view concluding that
“depriving individuals of a tort remedy for defamation is an
inappropriate and inefficient method for changing public attitudes
about homosexuality.”208 It should be noted, however, that
caselaw and legislation within a specific jurisdiction may indicate
a public acceptance of homosexuality that negates a finding that
one is injured when publicly labeled as homosexual.209 Therefore,
in jurisdictions where the conditions of the latter proposition are
met, pro-active judicial decisions in defamation suits are neither
unwarranted nor unprecedented.210
205

See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.D for the applicable legal standards in
defamation actions, New Jersey’s statutory and common law requirements,
and judicial discretion in determining whether a defamation claim is
cognizable.
206
See supra Part II.A (explaining that defamatory statements are those
that harm one’s reputation).
207
See Arend, supra note 194, at 111.
208
Id. at 113-14.
209
Fogle, supra note 4, at 176. Fogle utilized a comparison between
statements that a white person is African-American and those labeling a
heterosexual as homosexual. He noted the following:
[T]he two examples differ in the degree to which society has
determined to treat people of color and gays equally. In the first
instance, equal protection laws have been established throughout the
nation to protect employment, housing, and other rights. Such laws
concerning gays and lesbians are largely absent at the federal level
and local protection varies greatly in different regions of the country.
Therefore, it would not be logical to treat allegations that someone is
white the same way as allegations that someone is not heterosexual,
except where the jurisdiction has adopted a similar attitude regarding
the two populations.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
210
Additionally, because decisions in defamation suits inherently reflect
the competing policy tensions between one’s desire to protect his or her
reputation and society’s interest in protecting First Amendment rights, the fact
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At least one commentator has argued that courts should never
deny economic recovery to those who consider themselves
harmed by an accusation of homosexuality.211 Such a bright-line
rule, however, unnecessarily overlooks affirmative steps taken by
a particular jurisdiction’s legislative and judicial systems to
expunge the legal system of discriminatory treatment of gays and
lesbians.212 Further, such a rule neglects the fact that merely
allowing homosexuality to remain on the list of legally
“offensive” terms may have a deleterious effect upon how the
community at large views gays and lesbians.213 Finally, because
plaintiffs who bring defamation suits are not necessarily
motivated by financial factors, a court that dismisses a
defamation suit does not always risk leaving a person financially
damaged.214
The court’s conclusion in Gray has far-reaching effects upon
that plaintiffs in defamation suits tend to have non-economic motives should be
carefully considered. See Boies, supra note 47, at 1298.
211
Arend, supra note 194, at 114.
212
See supra Parts I and II for analysis of relevant New Jersey legislation
and caselaw.
213
See generally Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle:
Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643
(2001). Similar arguments have been made about the impact of “unenforced”
sodomy laws upon a community’s treatment of homosexuals. Goodman
borrowed from sociolegal studies of law founded in constitutive theories and
analyzed the ways in which sodomy laws “operate in daily life by shaping
interpersonal relations, influencing daily habits and helping define civic
identity.” Id. at 666.
214
Boies, supra note 47, at 1298-99.
Defamation actions, particularly those that involve individuals,
usually have strong noneconomic motives. Defamation litigation
usually arises when someone is hurt. They are hurt and they are
angry. They may or may not have suffered a calculable economic
loss, but they are often going to be less motivated by that loss, and
less constrained by the economic costs of litigation, than most
potential plaintiffs.
Id. But see Post, supra note 32, at 694. In expounding upon the “reputation as
property” theory of defamation law, Post points out that perhaps “the value of
reputation is determined by the marketplace in exactly the same manner that
the marketplace determines the cash value of any property loss.” Id.
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all individuals who attribute to themselves the status of being a
homosexual.215 While the defendant in Gray referred to Starr as
“the lesbian cowgirl,” he did not claim that she engaged in
homosexual acts, frequented gay bars or even affiliated herself
with openly gay individuals.216 This is a decidedly status-based
imputation, distinct from a public statement that one engages in
specific, possibly reprehensible, or even criminal acts.217 Further,
New Jersey’s high court has recognized that homosexuality is a
trait inseparable from personal identity.218 Therefore, regardless
of how lawfully or respectfully an individual may conduct him or
herself, Gray has the practical effect of hanging a label of
opprobrium upon the entire class of individuals who identify
themselves as homosexual.219 Put another way, Gray provides

215

See generally Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991)
(stating that discrimination against immutable characteristics such as
homosexuality will cause “significant damage to the individual’s sense of
self”).
216
Interestingly, if the defendant had stated that Ms. Starr was affiliated
with gay individuals or organizations, this would have been true and therefore
not actionable as defamatory because, as noted, Ms. Starr admitted that she
appeared in Philadelphia Gay Pride Parade and in the accompanying outdoor
festival. See supra note 132.
217
Some courts have noted this status-act distinction. See, e.g., Donovan
v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1994) (claiming falsely that plaintiffs were
gay or bisexual did not carry with it an automatic reference to any particular
activity and therefore was not tantamount to charging that individual with the
commission of a crime under state sodomy law sufficient for classification as
defamatory per se); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)
(stating that defendant’s reference to plaintiff as a “fag” could reasonably only
be interpreted to assert plaintiff was homosexual and statement therefore did
not import commission of homosexual acts). See also MAYER, supra note 10,
at 35 (“A charge of child abuse, molestation or rape involves distinguishable
criminal conduct or a decidedly loathsome character and must remain a proper
subject for relief.”).
218
See In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
As early as 1976, New Jersey’s high court recognized that a person’s sex or
sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, one’s self-image, and his or her
deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character. Id.
219
See Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (holding that words that
impute conduct calculated to injure a plaintiff in the eyes of a considerable and
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legal permission to condemn any individual who identifies herself
as homosexual on the basis of her status alone.
To better understand the impact of Gray, one should engage
in an intellectual exercise. First, note that statements are only
actionable as defamatory if they are false.220 It is self evident,
then, that an individual who has openly acknowledged him or
herself as gay or lesbian could not maintain a defamation action
for public statements referring to him or her as such, regardless
of any real or actual harm to their reputation.221 At first glance,
this seems a simple conclusion. In light of Gray, however,
openly gay individuals in New Jersey must now live not only
without legal recourse to redeem their potentially damaged
reputation, but must also accept the fact that society can, with the
blessing of the court, view their status as gay as less than
desirable. In fact, no matter how much pride a gay or lesbian
person takes in his or her identity, judicial decree now tells all
homosexuals in New Jersey that revealing their sexual orientation
may lower their reputation in the minds of respectable members
of the community.222 Gray effectively relegates gays and lesbians

respectable class of the community, though not in the eyes of the whole
community, are libelous).
220
Truth is an affirmative defense to defamation. LAURENCE ELDREDEGE,
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 323 (1977). See also 22 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of
Facts § 305 (1993) (noting that a publication must contain a false statement of
fact to give rise to liability for defamation).
221
An individual who has previously stated or admitted his or her
homosexuality would have disclosed it as fact, thus precluding him or her
from bringing a cause of action against one who would publish an imputation
of his or her homosexuality, because only false statements are defamatory. See
id.; see also Hein v. Lacy, 616 P.2d 277 (Kan. 1980) (finding statements that
the plaintiff favored the legalization of homosexuality and the
decriminalization of marijuana not defamatory because they were substantially
true inasmuch as they reflected plaintiff’s voting record as a state senator).
222
See Fogle, supra note 4, at 173. One of the limitations on the law of
defamation is that a statement is only deemed defamatory “if it prejudices a
person in the eyes of a substantial number of ‘right-minded’ people.” Id.
Fogle uses the analogy of racial or ethnic remarks to illustrate that by
dismissing certain defamation claims courts may “implicitly [label] racists as
‘wrong-thinking.’” Id.
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in a position of political and legal second-class citizenship.
Cast in this light, the practical effects and future impact of
Gray can be fully examined. First, to the extent that Gray offers
protection to anyone, it is only to those members of society who
consider themselves defamed by a label of homosexuality.223
Obviously, however, a plaintiff’s reputation “could only be
injured in the eyes of homophobic individuals.”224 In the event
that a heterosexual in New Jersey wishes to redeem his or her
reputation by removing the stigma of homosexuality, he or she
may do so. This may be considered a rare event, given that in the
history of New Jersey’s courts such an action has been before the
court only once.225 Homosexuals, however, may live their entire
adult lives identifying themselves as gay, lesbian, bi-sexual or
transgendered.226 The damage done to the psyche of those who
have already “come out” in a community is far more enduring
than to those who are subject to a single, false statement that they
are gay or lesbian.227 Similarly, finding that homosexuality as a
status is defamatory may deter people from privately, let alone
publicly, acknowledging their homosexuality.228

223

This logically comports with the analysis laid out above, that plaintiffs
in defamation suits are not primarily motivated by financial desires, but rather
are seeking to clear their reputation of an allegedly defamatory implication.
An individual would necessarily have to consider his or her reputation harmed
to be motivated to sue in the first instance. See supra note 214 and
accompanying text. See also, Fogle, supra note 4, at 176.
224
Fogle, supra note 4, at 176; see also, Lidsky, supra note 8, at 34.
225
This is true at least with respect to New Jersey appellate courts with
reported decisions, inasmuch as this was a question of first impression before
the Gray court. See supra note 157.
226
The mutability of sexual orientation has been the subject of numerous
legal, medical and academic studies. This comments restricts analysis to those
who have publicly acknowledged their sexual orientation as other than
heterosexual.
227
See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Toward Equal
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915
(1989); see also Leslie, supra note 1, at 105.
228
Halley, supra note 227, at 945-46 (“The legal and social burdens
imposed on homosexual identity deter individuals whose desires and behavior
are entirely or partially homosexual from acknowledging that fact.”).
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In a legal context, because a statement that one is homosexual
is actionable as defamatory when false, defamation law provides
harbor only for those willing to publicly denounce and litigate
against such a statement.229 While this legal consequence may be
correct in suggesting that those who disclose their homosexuality
do not regard it as harming their reputation, practically speaking,
it leaves only two options for self-identified homosexuals: they
must either (1) acknowledge and subjectively regard their
homosexuality as degrading or (2) hide it.230 This not only places
a premium on heterosexuality, but simultaneously functions as
legal deterrant for those who wish to be openly gay. It is easy to
see, then, that while other groups are free to promulgate hatred
through spreading lies that a heterosexual is gay, gays and
lesbians have very little opportunity to expunge their own
identities of this judicially-imposed pejorative meaning.231 It has
been noted that, because of harsh societal penalties, many
homosexual persons conceal their sexual orientation.232
Accordingly, the Gray rule may have the practical effect of
politically silencing gays and lesbians, as it results in the removal
of homosexuals from open political activity.233 This would only
diminish any perspective or sensitivity by the heterosexual
majority for concerns of the homosexual community.234 Given
that the New Jersey legislature has explicitly encouraged gays
and lesbians to participate in the state’s political forum, it is hard
229

As noted in supra note 220, truth is an affirmative defense to
defamation. Furthermore, although anyone may consider his or her reputation
to have been harmed by a statement, it is self-evident that no one is required to
litigate.
230
This sort of “rock and a hard place” analysis has been noted by at least
one commentator with regard to government policy of firing all homosexuals.
See Halley, supra note 227, at 957, construing Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, sub nom,
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
231
See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating
that homosexuals face severe limitations on their ability to protect their
interests by means of the political process).
232
Halley, supra note 227, at 957.
233
Id.
234
Id.
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to imagine that this effect is desired. 235
Additionally, inasmuch as Gray legally sanctions negative
perceptions of gays and lesbians, it also implicitly tolerates, and
may well foster, homophobia in New Jersey.236 Though
defamation is a civil wrong and does not carry the impact of
attributing criminal status to a class of individuals, the fact
remains that judicial determinations in defamation suits
unequivocally label certain acts or classes of people as
undesirable.237 Allowing homosexuality to remain on the list of
“legally offensive” terms may prevent gays and lesbians from
reporting bias or hate crimes against them.238 In a jurisdiction that
has articulated an interest in protecting homosexuals from this
very type of isolation, it is antithetical for a court to declare that
one person’s legally protected, public acknowledgement of
homosexuality is another’s cause for a lawsuit.
Further, the harmful seeds sowed by judicial decree in
defamation suits have especially subversive results because,
unlike anti-gay legislation or active discrimination by specific
organizations, a judicial declaration that attaches stigma to a
particular class cannot be redacted by political lobbying or
advocacy.239 Gay rights organizations have successfully affected
235

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8 (West 2002) (stating that the Human
Relations Council “shall consist of an executive committee which shall include
ten public members who shall be representative of the various ethnic;
religious; national origin; racial; sexual orientation; gender; and disabilities
organizations in the State”).
236
In the same manner that finding racial comments actionable as
defamatory has been considered as sanctioning racism, homophobia is
implicitly tolerated, if not affirmed, by finding an imputation of homosexuality
defamatory. See Fogle, supra note 4, at 174.
237
See Arend, supra note 194, at 112. Inasmuch as criminal statutes have
the immediate effect of denoting certain acts as “criminal,” civil laws and tort
claims function to make the injured party whole. Id. Arend argued that tort
law is not properly employed as a mechanism to change social attitudes. See
id. (“Depriving individuals of a tort remedy for defamation is an inappropriate
and inefficient method for changing public attitudes about homosexuality. The
role of tort law is to make the injured whole, not to change social mores.”).
238
See Halley, supra note 227, at 957.
239
See supra Part I.B (noting that the only statutes governing the law of
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legislative approaches to numerous causes in New Jersey.240 As
noted, the legislative and judicial branches of the state
government have been receptive to passing and interpreting laws
so as not to advance discriminatory attitudes or initiatives.241
Defamation law, however, is unique because there is not, and
perhaps cannot be, a mechanism to attack the discrimination that
it undoubtedly fosters.242 In a single decision, Gray now
effectively provides the legal legs upon which individuals who
wish to advance anti-gay and homophobic agendas may stand.
Because control over the boundaries of defamatory categories is
placed in the hands of judges, only a decree from the bench can
eradicate the myriad, pervasive effects of Gray.243

defamation in New Jersey pertain to retraction and pleading requirements).
240
Numerous groups are active in lobbying for gay rights and electing
officials supportive of gay and lesbian initiatives in New Jersey. For examples
of state and local organizations and their political efforts, see e.g., New Jersey
Stonewall Democrats, at http://www.geocities.com/njstoned/WTC.html (outlining mission statement of coalition of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgendered individuals effecting change within the state Democratic Party)
(last visited Mar. 24, 2002); New Jersey Lesbian and Gay Coalition, at
http://www.njlgc.org (detailing efforts of non-profit organization committed to
sexual orientation-based discrimination through public advocacy, education,
political action and legal reform) (last visited Mar. 24, 2002); Gay and
Lesbian Political Action and Support Groups, at http://www.gaypasg.org/
Projects/STOP%20HARASSMENT%20AND%20BULLYINg.htm (outlining
work done to pass bills in the New Jersey Senate and Assembly that would
implement sexual orientation provisions of the state’s LAD to further safe
schools and community violence prevention by requiring school districts to
adopt harassment and bullying prevention) (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
241
See supra Parts I.E.1, I.E.2 (examining New Jersey legislation and
caselaw relevant to sexual orientation).
242
Courts do not recognize a cause of action where the allegedly
defamatory statement is directed at a group. See, e.g., Neiman Marcus v.
Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“Where the group or class
disparaged is a large one, absent circumstances pointing to a particular
plaintiff as the person defamed, no individual member of the group or class
has a cause of action.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 564(c)).
243
As noted in supra Part I.B., it is for the court to determine whether a
statement is defamatory in the first instance.
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III. A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL: SHEDDING LIGHT IN A
GRAY AREA
Although courts in the United States are divided as to whether
a false imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se or
defamatory per quod,244 no court has concluded that an accusation
of homosexuality is not actionable under any circumstance.245 A
recent case from New South Wales, Australia, Rivkin v.
Amalgamated Television Services, however, concluded that a jury
is no longer allowed to decide on the defamatory character of
imputations that a person may be homosexual.246 While this
opinion is from an international jurisdiction, the mechanisms
applied by the court are enlightening. Rivkin referred to the
framework of state and federal legislative provisions to determine
the community’s view on homosexuality.247 Significantly, the
legislation presently in place in New Jersey nearly mirrors that of
the jurisdiction in Rivkin.248 Unlike the Gray court, the Rivkin
244

Defamation per se is “a statement that is defamatory in and of itself
and is not capable of an innocent meaning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427
(7th ed. 1999). Defamation per quod is a statement that that “either (1) is not
apparent but is proved by extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or
(2) is apparent but is not a statement that is actionable per se.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999).
245
See supra Part I.C (reviewing caselaw finding imputations of
homosexuality to be either defamatory per se or per quod).
246
Rivkin v. Amalgamated Television Servs. Pty. Ltd., 2001 NSW
LEXIS 432 (N.S. W. S. Ct. 2001).
247
Id. at *5. Specifically, the court noted that the former proscription of
homosexual conduct between consenting males adults was abolished by
amendment in 1984. The Anti-Discrimination Act includes unlawful
discrimination on the grounds of homosexuality in a wide range of contexts
and includes a provision making it unlawful to incite hatred towards, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person on the grounds of homosexuality.
The Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act broadened the
definition of “de facto relationship” to include homosexual relationships, thus
providing for court orders adjusting property rights between homosexual
couples upon the termination of a domestic relationship. Id.
248
See supra Parts I, II. For a comprehensive overview and state-by-state
comparative analysis of New Jersey’s laws on sexuality-related topics, readers
are encouraged to examine Overview of State Sexuality Laws generated by the
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court found that “it is no longer open to contend that the shared
social and moral standards with which the ordinary reasonable
member of the community is imbued include that of holding
homosexual men . . . in lesser regard on account of that fact
alone.”249 The facts underlying Rivkin are distinguishable, but the
court’s conclusion and analysis are instructive.250
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently stated, “the
human price of this bigotry has been enormous. At a most
fundamental level, adherence to the principle of equality demands
that our legal system protect the victims of invidious
discrimination.”251 It would seem reasonable to conclude,
therefore, that the court is amenable to progressive solutions like
those employed in Rivkin to cure social ills. At a minimum, the
state courts have acknowledged the legal impact upon the
political and social reality of what it means to be an openly gay
individual. The court should have utilized existing legislation and
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS),
available at http://www.siecus.org/policy/states (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
249
Rivkin, 2001 NSW LEXIS at *7 (emphasis added). The court allowed
plaintiff to re-plead his case, and submitted to the jury an amended contention
that defendant had abused his position of power in an employee-employer
relation by engaging in a homosexual affair with a third party. Id.
250
Id. at *1-2. The defendant in Rivkin was responsible for airing a
television broadcast that suggested the plaintiff was criminally liable for the
death of a woman who was the partner of a man the program alleged to be
engaged in a homosexual relationship with the plaintiff. Id. Based on the
broadcast, Mr. Rivkin sued the television station. In addition to the imputation
of homosexuality, he pled that three additional imputations in the program
were defamatory. Id. The court acknowledged defendant’s challenge to the
charges involving homosexuality as the following:
[U]ntil relatively recent times the charge that a man had had
homosexual intercourse with another would, without more, have been
capable of being defamatory of him. However, [defendant] submitted
that there had been a change in the social and moral standards of the
community such that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that
right thinking members of the society generally would hold that the
mere fact of homosexual intercourse lowered a man in their estimate.
Id. at *5. The plaintiff successfully pled that various other imputations within
the television broadcast should be submitted to the jury. Id.
251
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999).
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recent caselaw as a reflection of community and legal values to
determine that an imputation of homosexuality is actionable as
defamatory.
CONCLUSION
It is widely accepted that defamation law is an odd and
confusing conglomeration of varying standards and procedures.252
Rather than lending reason and clarity to the realm of defamation
law, Gray has the dubious distinction of further muddying the
“intellectual wasteland” of inconsistent rulings and unenlightened
decisions.253 While commentators urge for closer judicial scrutiny
to prevent abuse of defamation law, Gray clearly overlooked the
need for legal reform.254 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
should have re-examined Gray to insure that judicial decisions
are consistent with the broader efforts of the legal system.
Similarly, the social phenomenon of homophobia cannot
feasibly be attributed to a single source.255 A reconsideration of
Gray would have effectuated the court’s articulated goal of
expunging society of sexual orientation-based discrimination.
Some commentators have expressed expectation, and even hope,
that homosexuality will one day go the path of other categories
into the annals of defamatory anachronisms.256 No court in the
United States has risen to the challenge.257 The Supreme Court of
252

See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771-72.
See Post, supra note 32, at 691.
254
MAYER, supra note 11, at 214 (stating that “courts must be tough in
defining defamatory language to prevent abuse of the law . . . . Short of false
and malicious statements clearly causing actual damages many defamation
cases could well be summarily dismissed.”).
255
See generally Leslie, supra note 1, at 105.
256
See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 11, at 35; Arend, supra note 194, at
114; Fogle, supra note 4, at 166; Lidsky, supra note 8, at 36.
257
See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that allegation of homosexuality is not slander per se and
questioning, in dicta, whether such allegation should even be defamatory at
all); see generally, 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 199 (1995)
(articulating the various positions taken by state and federal courts, all of
which held that imputations of homosexuality are either defamatory per se or
253
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New Jersey stood in the unique position to provide substantial
and effective analysis to this question.258 This comment does not
suggest that a reversal of Gray would have erased homophobia
from the fabric of society, or even from the state of New Jersey.
A more enlightened analysis of the policy issues at stake in Gray,
however, may have provided grounds for a reversal, which
would have been a step in the direction of removing the scourge
of sexual orientation based discrimination.259 In light of current
legislation and the strongly worded decisions previously rendered
by New Jersey courts, it is lamentable that the archaic conclusion
of Gray was allowed to stand.

per quod).
258
The petition for certification of the appellate court’s decision was
denied. See supra note 156.
259
Leslie, supra note 1, at 105.

